German-German dialogue in spite of the GDR’s self-detachment : Germany

In spite of the GDR’s continuing efforts to cut itself off completely from the West (e.g. by requiring passports and visas for persons in transit between the Federal Republic and Berlin (West)) and in spite of the Warsaw Pact’s crushing of attempted reforms in Czechoslovakia (Prague Spring) in 1968, the “Brezhnev Doctrine” of the indivisibility of the socialist bloc did not have any serious repercussions on the process of detente. In April 1969 Bonn said it was ready to enter into agreements with the GDR below the level of international recognition. Obviously, German-German agreements of this kind could hardly be achieved without some kind of prior understanding with Moscow. When the Soviet Union proposed a non-aggression pact, the “Ostpolitk” (new eastern policy) adopted by the Social-Liberal coalition that had assumed power in Bonn on 21 October 1969 quickly began to take on substance.

A few months previously (5 March 1969), Gustav Heine-mann, who even in Adenauer’s day had been a strong advocate of East-West rapprochement, had been elected Federal President. Willy Brandt, who had played an active part in the resistance against the Hitler dictatorship, was now head of a federal government which directed its energies to the construction of a peaceful order throughout Europe. The international constellation was favorable. Moscow and Washington were negotiating on the limitation ot strategic arms (SALT), and NATO proposed negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR). On 28 November 1969 the Federal Republic became a party to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Following the turbulence experienced by its predecessor, the grand coalition government (Vietnam conflict, emergency legislation/Auschwitz trials, Extra-Parliamentary Opposition and student revolts), the new cabinet, by embarking on its “Ostpolitik”, placed itself under considerable pressure to produce results.